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Introduction
A critique of Anthropological Evolution-
ary Ecology (AEE) as a theoretical paradigm
should begin with a definition of paradigm. Fol-
lowing Kuhn (1970), the definition reads: a para-
digm is the world view, belief systems, series of
assumptions, methods, techniques and exem-
plars for problem solution held in common by a
scientific community. The critique here is meant
to apply to AEE as a theoretical paradigm in
general, often referred to as evolutionary behav-
ioral ecology and to its submodels and
subtheories, in particular optimal foraging
theory and life history theory.
The critique is divided into seven sections,
closely paralleling the structure of Figure 1. This
scheme depicts the general components of theory
and their degrees of development.  Basically, as
theory develops, it changes in two major ways:
1) through the addition of theoretical compo-
nents (see rows in Figure 1); and 2) through the
refinement of components (see columns in Fig-
ure 1). This scheme shows both increase in the
number and refinement of components as theory
matures. The column headings from left to right
represent increasing development of theory,
whereas the rows from top to bottom indicate
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The goal of this paper is to critically evaluate Anthropological Evolutionary Ecology (AEE) as a paradigm by
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logical Evolutionary Ecology, however, references will be made to Biological Evolutionary Ecology (BEE)
since AEE relies heavily on theoretical components derived from BEE.
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increasing completeness of theory. Box 1 de-
scribes the major components of theory that are
referred to in the rows of Figure 1. Box 2 de-
scribes the stages of maturation depicted in the
columns of  Figure 1. During the early stages of
theory development, the emphasis is on the ad-
dition of components. By the consolidating stage
of theory development all of the components are
in place. Subsequently, refinement of compo-
nents is emphasized.
Thus, as theory develops, it becomes more
and more complete, by the addition and refine-
ment of theoretical notions, constructs, derived
constructs, and structure.  Increasing richness
of components is a hallmark of maturing theory.
For AEE, notions, assumptions, facts, and hy-
potheses developed early, with assumptions be-
ing the first to be fully developed. But notions
are not yet fully explicit, and confirmed gener-
alizations, models, translation modes, domain
and the framework are still in the process of be-
ing refined.
The stages of maturation depicted in the
columns of Fig. 1 can be thought of as an ideal-
ized developmental sequence. Theory change is
actually often chaotic, reflecting a combination
1Department of Anthropology, University of Georgia, sejoseph@arches.uga.edu.
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FIGURE 1. COMPLETENESS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY.
See Box 1 for a description of the components. Degree of hatching denotes increased refine-
ment and precision in theory development (modified from Figure 4.1 of Pickett et al. 1994).
                                       DEGREE OF DEVELOPMENT
                               Status
           Component
Pre-
theoretic
Intuitive Consolidating Empirical-
Interactive
Confirmed
or Rejected
Notions ///// ///// ///// ///// ///////////
Assumptions ///// ////// ///////// ///////// ///////////
Definitions ///// ////// ///////// ///////////
Concepts ///// ////// ///////// ///////////
Facts ///// ///// ////// ///////// ///////////
Confirmed
Generalizations ///// ////// ///////////
Hypotheses ///// ///// ////// ///////// ///////////
Models ///// ////// ///////// ///////////
Theorems ///// ////// ///////////
Framework ///// ////// ///////////
Domain ///// ///// ////// /////// ///////////
Translation
Modes ///// ////// ///////////
Basic Conceptual Devices
• assumptions–conditions or axioms needed to build theory
• definitions–conventions and prescriptions necessary for the theory to work with clarity
• concepts–abstract ideas generalized from regularities in phenomena, or
conceived through reflection and imagination
Empirical Content
• facts–confirmable records of phenomena, checked and re-checked
• confirmed generalizations–condensations and abstractions from a body of facts that have been checked
and re-checked
Derived Conceptual Devices
• hypotheses–testable statements derived from or representing various components of theory
• models–conceptual constructs that represent or simplify the world or subject matter of concern
• theorems—ideas or propositions deduced or proposed as demonstrable deductions
Framework and Structure
• framework–nested causal or logical structure of a theory
• domain–the scope in space, time and phenomena addressed by a theory
• translation modes–procedures and concepts needed to move from the abstractions of a theory to the
specifics of application or test
BOX 1. COMPONENTS OF THEORY (modified from Pickett et al. 1994, Box 3.2).
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of different empirical pursuits and different
subtheories, and in the case of AEE, more com-
plex or highly derived components have not yet
accompanied simpler ones. Draw-ing on other
theories for components has also resulted in
transfer problems, where those components have
acquired different meanings and interpretations
problematic in their new context. Nonetheless,
the key idea is that the jobs a theory is able to
do depend upon its stage of maturity (Box 2);
that is, the richness of its roster of theoretical
components and their refinement.
As a theory begins to take shape and to be
used it often becomes clear that existing com-
ponents must be replaced or refined. Theory may
emerge from pre-theoretic notions by adding
components, without showing much refinement.
At the consolidating stage basic conceptual com-
ponents are refined, empirical content is refined
and expanded, derived conceptual components
are added and refined, and the theoretical frame-
work and structure begin to take shape.
Mature theories have well-defined basic
conceptual constructs and derived conceptual
devices, as well as well-delineated domains, with
internal structure and empirical content, allow-
ing the development of hypotheses that can be
confirmed or rejected. Confirmed mature theory
has developed through prior phases of pre-
theory, intuition, consolidation and empirical-
interaction (see Figure 1). Such theories come
to represent the particular historical time peri-
ods within which they develop.
A major criticism of AEE as a theoretical
framework that I explore at some length in this
paper is its failure to delineate a domain. I first
came across AEE during the course of my gradu-
ate training in ecological anthropology. I found
particularly attractive a field that seemed to hold
the promise (both implicitly because of its name
and explicitly in its purported goal) of adding
methodological and theoretical rigor to ecologi-
cal anthropology. Here, I thought, I will find
the best of what anthropology has to offer the
study of human evolution and ecology. How-
ever, it soon became clear that AEE was not what
it seemed (i.e., a broad framework which in-
cludes an amalgam of sophisticated approaches
to understanding human variation and change).
While the purpose of this paper is not to de-
velop an alternative framework for the study of
human ecology and evolution, Figure 2 provides
a brief glimpse into a more inclusive human evo-
lutionary ecology; what I naïvely imagined the
domain of anthropological evolutionary ecology
to look like.  Potential contributions to the study
of  human ecology and evolution are listed ac-
cording to social hierarchies of major human
ecological paradigms: population and ecosystems
(for a discussion of  the characteristics of  “popu-
lation” and “ecosystem” paradigms in biological
ecology and their integration see Pickett et al.
1994: 3-25;151-165).
Thus, I will begin the second section with
a critical discussion of the domain of AEE since
it is problematic throughout the theoretical de-
velopment of AEE. The domain is formulated
early in theory development, but is only fully
articulated at later stages of theory maturation.
Discussion of the domain will help provide a gen-
Pre-theoretic—represented by rudimentary development of a few components
Intuitive—simple and fundamental components present, including concepts, definitions and models
Consolidating—derived conceptual devices begin to mature
Empirical-Interactive—with concepts, definitions, and domain increasingly clarified, hypotheses are more
amenable to evaluation
Confirmed or Rejected—judgement by the community of the adequacy of evaluation and strength of
those outcomes for a mature theory; confirmed theories often permit practical application
BOX  2. STAGES TO THEORY MATURITY (based on Pickett et al. 1994, Box 4.1 and Figure 4.1).
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eral understanding of the spatial and temporal scale
and hierarchical level of organization to which AEE
applies. The third section will critique the basic
conceptual content of AEE, describing the basic
conceptual devices found in AEE.  The fourth sec-
tion will evaluate the empirical content of AEE by
examining the facts or confirmed generalizations
AEE has contributed to our understanding of hu-
man ecology and evolution. The fifth section will
critically discuss the derived conceptual devices
employed by AEE such as hypotheses, theorems
and models to determine their utility in under-
standing human behavior. The sixth section will
discuss inadequacies in theory structure and frame-
work as they exist today, and the conclusion will
summarize major points of the critique.
Domain of Anthropological Evolutionary
Ecology via Its Parent Discipline Biological
Evolutionary Ecology
The domain “delimits the scope in space,
time and level of organization of a class of phe-
nomena assumed (by theory) to share certain
properties and be of a distinct and general type”
(Hirschfield and Gelman 1994:21). The do-
mains of an inquiry should be explicit and spe-
cific, as much as possible, though they may be
expanded or restricted as theory develops. Do-
mains typically become more restricted as
theory develops because refinement shows that
the theory is not as grandly applicable as origi-
nally presumed.
AEE assumes that humans can be under-
stood using the same assumptions and tech-
niques that are used to analyze other animals
(Hill 1993). Specifically, the AEE paradigm as-
sumes that its neo-Darwinian approach can be
used fruitfully to understand dungflies, reef
fish, monkeys, swallows and humans (Betzig
1997). AEE sets out to understand how phe-
notypic traits of organisms in general can be
understood as adaptations in ecological context.
That is, AEE is concerned with “unleashing the
power of Darwinism” to understand the design
features of organisms (whether human or non-
human) and as such does not in principle ad-
dress or concern itself with how an ecological
understanding of human behavior is to differ
from that of other complex organisms (Smith
1992a, 1992b). There is no attempt within AEE
to delineate the boundaries or domain of in-
vestigation and specify that various predictions
derived from AEE models are only potentially
useful for understanding human behavior in
highly circumscribed circumstances or at very
limited levels of analysis.
In fact, it is sometimes stated that the ul-
timate goal of AEE is to provide a single gen-
eral model for understanding variation in for-
aging behavior in time and space (Hill 1988).
And as Vayda (1995a) points out, even AEE
models that fail to confirm expectations derived
from neo-Darwinian theory are still argued to
have heuristic value, which only obfuscates the
attempt to establish and refine the domain of
inquiry. Since the foundational core of AEE is
its neo-Darwinian reliance on natural selection
for explanation, a well-established theory in the
biological sciences, it might be assumed that
the domain is virtually boundless. However, as
Mayr (1993) reminds us, Darwin’s theory was
derived deductively, and depends upon the
presence of certain conditions. So I will dis-
cuss how the domain of biological evolution-
ary ecology (BEE), and, in particular, the do-
main of the Darwinian theory of natural selec-
tion, is becoming more delimited within evo-
lutionary biology.
Mayr (1993) points out that Darwin
(1902) presented his theory of natural selec-
tion deductively, which was subsequently for-
malized by Huxley (1942) and Mayr (1993).
The theory rests upon certain necessary condi-
tions. If these conditions do not hold, then
natural selection need not occur. Table 1 sum-
marizes the conditions necessary for the occur-
rence of evolution by natural selection.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol4/iss1/1 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.4.1.1
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TABLE 1. A COMBINED ADAPTATION OF MAYR’S (1993, FIGURE 1) AND BENNETT’S (1997, TABLE 8.1)
FORMALIZATION OF DARWIN’S DEDUCTIVE THEORY OF EVOLUTION THROUGH NATURAL SELECTION.
The view of evolution espoused by most
ecologists today is basically that of Darwin (1902)
integrated by modern genetics. At the core of the
modern synthesis is the acceptance of two conclu-
sions:
Gradual evolution can be explained in terms of
small genetic changes (“mutations”) and
recombination, and the ordering of this genetic
variation by natural selection; and the observed
evolutionary phenomena, particularly
macroevolutionary processes and speciation, can
be explained in a manner that is consistent with
the known genetic mechanisms. (Mayr 1980: 1)
However, the modern synthesis acceptance
of the Darwinian natural selection model of
generation-by-generation change extrapolated
back through geological time (Eldredge 1995)
is beginning to be refined. At the core of the
debate is the question of the proper domain of
Darwinian theory. For example, the debate be-
tween modern synthesis defenders and punc-
tuated equilibria defenders is whether the fact
of evolution at a broad scale can be explained
in terms of present microevolutionary processes
(substantive uniformitarianism). While most
comments on the debate have focused on
whether evolution has taken place by continu-
ous gradual change over long periods of time
or rapidly over shorter periods of time, many
have pointed out that this is not the central
issue (Bennett 1997).
Dawkins (1986) and Levinton (1988) have
correctly pointed out that the rates of evolution
may vary over time and can be sufficiently rapid
as to appear instantaneous in the fossil record.
If Condition 1:
Potential exponential
increase of populations
(superfecundity)
If Inference 1:
Struggle for existence
among individuals
OR...
If Condition 1:
Potential exponential
increase of populations
(superfecundity)
PLUS Condition 5:
Heritability of much of
the individual  variation
PLUS Condition 3:
Limitation of resources
PLUS Condition 5:
Heritability of much of the
individual variation
PLUS Condition 6:
Geographical isolation of
populations
AND THEREFORE
Inference 3: Speciation
PLUS Condition 2:
Observed steady state
stability of populations
PLUS Condition 4:
Individuals vary
PLUS Condition 2:
Observed steady state
stability of populations
THEREFORE
Inference 2: Differential
survival, i.e., natural
selection
THEREFORE Inference
1: Struggle for existence
among individuals
THEREFORE
Inference 2: Differential
survival, i.e., natural
selection
PLUS Condition 4:
Individuals vary
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However, the central criticism of the modern syn-
thesis does not center on rates of evolution, but
on uniformitarianism (Bennett 1997: 34). As
Bennett (1997: 34) points out, the architects of
the punctuated equilibria model are questioning
the modern synthesis position that knowledge of
the present is adequate to explain the record of
the past.  The only way of resolving this dispute
is to examine the fossil record.
One of the fundamental questions to be de-
termined from the fossil record is: what happens
to species during long periods of undoubted en-
vironmental change? Under uniformitarianism or
phyletic gradualism, the expectation is that there
would be evolutionary change, but under punc-
tuated equilibria there is not necessarily an ex-
pectation of change (Bennett 1997: 43). Recent
geological evidence (for a more thorough review
see Bennett 1997:92-198) indicates that climates
have been changing globally with frequencies on
Milankovitch time-scales (ca. 20,000-100,000 yr)
throughout Earth history. Yet, it is only during
the most recent part of the geological record that
sediments have been sampled finely enough, and
there is a time-scale precise enough, to make use-
ful statements about the response of organisms
to global climatic change. The portion of the geo-
logical record most accessible is the Quaternary.
The overall evidence shows that for most fos-
sil groups through most of the Quaternary, there
is remarkably little evidence of evolutionary
change. Species during the course of their history
may experience three types of evolutionary pat-
terns: stasis, gradual change, and quick change
plus or minus speciation by lineage splitting. All
these patterns of evolution occur in the Quater-
nary (Bennett 1997: 175). Nevertheless, stasis is
the most frequent response to Quaternary climatic
change. Through climatic oscillations on
Milankovitch time-scales, the morphological sta-
bility of species is impressive (Gould 1992). In
ecological time, on a microevolutionary scale,
natural selection has been shown to have occurred
(for example among populations of Darwin’s
finches) in response to environmental change, but
there is no evidence that it accumulates over
longer periods of time to bring about speciation
in the Darwinian sense (although this may still
be a plausible hypothesis for a subset of evolu-
tionary change)(see Steadman 1986).
Thus, many paleontologists in evolutionary
biology have begun to closely consider the do-
main of Darwinian theory. Eldredge (1999) rec-
ognizes that BEE maintains at its core the
Fisherian stance that natural selection is both
necessary and sufficient to explain the evolution
of life. As a theory, Eldredge (1999) indicates that
it works best in the domain it was originally de-
vised to explain, generation by generation adap-
tive change in gene frequencies. Similarly, he tries
to bound the domain of a related sister discipline
Sociobiology, which explains patterns of coopera-
tion in social organisms in terms of degree of
shared genes among the participants. Eldredge
and Grene (1992) point out that this theoretical
system works very well in the case of social in-
sects; however, it does not work as well in other
social organisms, such as birds and mammals.
Theoretical refinements in attempts to go beyond
the evolutionary ecology brand of evolutionary
biology are evident . The example of Milankovitch
cycles and physical processes in evolutionary
change is one attempt. Another attempt at theo-
retical refinement can be seen in the theory of
co-evolution, in which two species adaptive sys-
tems, such as butterfly/milkweed, are analyzed.
Yet another is Leigh Van Valen’s notion of the Red
Queen, where the evolution of one species is con-
sidered as a reaction to changes from other spe-
cies impacting it.
Thus, there is a need for AEE to bound the
scope and scale of theoretical investigation. After
all, no single theory can account for the entire
range of variation and change in human socio-
cultural behaviors, structures, interactions, and
flows across time and space. The failure to de-
limit the domain of AEE creates confusion and
debate as to its applicability. In order to deter-
mine what AEE can contribute to human ecology,
a more thorough understanding of its conceptual
and empirical content is needed. The basic con-
ceptual devices of AEE will be described next.
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Basic Conceptual Devices: Assumptions,
Definitions and Concepts in Anthropological
Evolutionary Ecology
AEE is the first attempt to develop a theory
of socio-cultural behavior in terms of the same prin-
ciples that guide biological theories of evolution.
AEE can be defined as the application of natural
selection theory at both the macro and micro evo-
lutionary scales to understanding adaptation and
biological design in ecological context
(Winterhalder and Smith 1992). AEE is a broad
theoretical umbrella, which unites diverse
subtheories and models. Typically, AEE studies the
consequences of the assumed operation of natural
selection on an organism’s phenotype (behavior in
particular). AEE comprises a wide range of phe-
nomena, including study of foraging strategies,
spatial organization, group size and formation, sex
allocation, mate choice, life history patterns, etc.
(Winterhalder and Smith 1992: 8). Oftentimes
AEE is referred to as evolutionary behavioral ecol-
ogy. However, if the behavior being studied involves
social interactions (and physiology is de-empha-
sized) then the term socioecology can be used
(Crook 1970).
Life history theory (LHT) is a subset of hu-
man behavioral ecology but focuses on particular
aspects of human behavior and physiology. Spe-
cifically, life history theory analyzes how individual
variation in life history traits leads to variation in
reproductive fitness among individuals (Stearns
1992). Life history theory makes the simplifying
assumption that the phenotype consists of demo-
graphic traits–size, number and sex ratio of off-
spring at birth, size at maturity, age at maturity,
age and sex-specific reproductive investment, age
and sex-specific mortality schedules, growth pat-
tern, and life span–bound together by constraining
relationships and tradeoffs (Charnov 1993, Roff 1992,
Stearns 1992).
However, four general features serve to unite
all of the loosely tied and/or diverse areas of inves-
tigation included under the theoretical umbrella
of AEE. (1) Deductive modeling-simple math-
ematical models (i.e., optimization or game theo-
retic models) deduced from general principles are
considered a useful means of generating powerful
explanations (Smith and Winterhalder 1992a;
Smith 1987, 1991; Borgerhoff-Mulder 1991),
although AEE does not require that behavior be
genetically determined or linked (Smith and
Winterhalder 1992a). (2) A neo-Darwinian
commitment to methodological individualism
or the self-interested individual as the unit of
analysis (Smith and Winterhalder 1992a, Smith
1992a, Borgerhoff-Mulder 1991). Methodologi-
cal individualism is a position which holds that
social and ecological aspects of groups or popula-
tions can be best understood as the result of ac-
tions/goals of aggregates of individuals who con-
stitute these larger groupings. (3) Selectionism,
which assumes the presence of variability that af-
fects selective fitness of reproductive “units” and
determines the presence of reproductive mecha-
nisms by which this variability is carried from “unit”
to “unit” (Smith and Winterhalder 1992a). It holds
that the properties of individuals can fruitfully be
analyzed using the theory of natural selection, that
selection acts on all aspects of phenotype that ex-
hibits variability and heritability (genetic or cul-
tural) and has effects on survival and reproduc-
tion, and that selection favors phenotypic traits that
exhibit high fitness or evolutionary stability (com-
petitive superiority when fitness is frequency de-
pendent). (4) Most aspects of behavior (whether
genetically or culturally transmitted) are highly
plastic and this plasticity can be modeled using
“decision rules” or conditional strategies (i.e., “if
the environment or payoff matrix looks like x, then
do y”). It is these strategies that are subject to se-
lection for maximum reproductive success or evo-
lutionary stability (Smith 1991).
Vayda (1995a) states that if one axiom were
to be highlighted as central to AEE it would have
to be (in the words of its practitioners “Darwin’s
central tenet”) that differential reproduction is
the primary force shaping biological adaptation
and diversity” (see Smith and Winterhalder
1992b: xiii), which is taken to mean that hu-
man behavior maximizes reproductive output.
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However, AEE employs various  measures of fit-
ness; that is, “proximate currencies” (e.g., rate of
food intake, number of surviving offspring, fertil-
ity rates, etc.), which are assumed to be highly cor-
related with the “ultimate currency” of reproduc-
tive success (Smith and Winterhalder 1992a: 34).
The assumptions made by AEE about natu-
ral selection, adaptation, fitness, optimality and
equilibrium are problematic. First, AEE assumes
that the human groups studied exhibit high re-
productive success and stability (Smith and
Winterhalder 1992a). However, as Bettinger
(1980) notes, a theory that is founded upon gen-
eralizations about consequences is difficult to
transform into one of evolutionary process or
change (which Bettinger argues is what evolution
is supposed to be about). Bettinger also claims
that to start out with theoretical assumptions
about evolutionary outcomes (in this case about
optimality and equilibrium) retards “an evolution-
ary inquiry from the start by placing the cart be-
fore the horse and positing consequence as cause–
assuming as it were one’s conclusions” (1991:
216). This methodological approach, described
by Gould and Lewontin (1979) as the
adaptationist program, characterizes AEE re-
search. The fundamental problem with proceed-
ing from initial assumptions about the general
consequences of evolutionary processes is that
there is nothing to guard against subverting the
empirical investigation of processes and mecha-
nisms to suit that assumption (Bettinger 1991:
222). Further discussion of how such problem-
atic assumptions and concepts lead to weaknesses
with models and overall explanatory framework
within AEE will be taken up in the sections on
derived conceptual devices and on theory frame-
work and structure.
Empirical Content of Theory: Facts and
Confirmed Generalizations in Anthropological
Evolutionary Ecology
AEE can contribute in some ways to our un-
derstanding of human ecology. Empirical contri-
butions from optimal foraging theory (which is
considered to be the most developed of all AEE
theories, see Smith and Winterhalder 1992a;
Smith 1992a, 1992b) and life history theory will
be evaluated. Optimal foraging theory will be
discussed first.
The key assumption of optimal foraging
models is that foragers will make choices that yield
the highest feasible rate of return (usually mea-
sured in energy) on their foraging effort (usually
measured in time) (Smith 1991, 1992a). Re-
searchers utilizing these models demonstrate that
foragers often choose prey that maximize the
mean rate of energy return per unit handling time
and that other edible lower ranked resources (that
offered lower returns) were ignored (Hawkes et
al. 1982, Hill et al. 1987, Smith 1991). The prob-
lem with the empirical observations generated by
these simple optimality models is not that they
have no empirical merit, but that they have a
much narrower meaning and significance than
recognized within AEE.
Empirical observations do not stand alone.
They are linked to conceptual constructs and the
explanatory framework of theory. A major prob-
lem with optimal foraging models lies in their fail-
ure to consider the distinction and interplay be-
tween prediction and explanation, pattern and
process, as well as the importance of scale. For
example, Boone and Smith (1998) cite  numer-
ous examples which predict, using foraging theory,
that humans will expand their prey choice to in-
clude lower-ranked (higher-cost) prey types as
encounter rates for higher-ranked resources are
reduced (p. S146). They believe this optimal-prey-
choice model  (often referred to as diet-breadth
model) “explains” individual decisions. Explana-
tion here is equated with prediction with no dis-
cussion of the distinction between prediction,
causal process, pattern, and mechanism. There is
no recognition that the processes which gives rise
to the observed behavioral pattern may be entirely
different in different cases, or that just because
you have successfully predicted something does
not mean that you have satisfactorily explained it
(see also discussion of predictive models within
AEE in the section on derived conceptual devices).
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This point can be illustrated with a few ex-
amples. Boone and Smith (1998) provide the ex-
ample from the work of Broughton (1994, 1995)
who finds that the pattern of decline in the abun-
dance of more profitable (higher-ranked) large-
bodied prey (such as deer, elk and sea otters) to
include lower ranked prey such as shellfish, small
game, and fish in pre-historic Central California
was due to long-term increase in human popula-
tion density. However, the authors point out that
whether the cause of dietary expansion was due
to climatic change, human overpopulation and/
or human overexploitation is not the issue since
all that matters is that the optimal model pre-
dicts the same broadening of the diet. However
it is the environmental and historical context in
which behaviors are found that gives them theo-
retical significance. Otherwise, empirical facts lose
their meaning and become trivial. Let us take
another example.
In a more recent example of technological
change in foraging behavior, Boone and Smith
(1998) cite the work of Winterhalder (1980,
1981) who found that Boreal Forest Cree adopted
the use of snowmobiles at the expense of snow-
shoes in hunting. Boone and Smith (1998) “ex-
plain” this behavior using the same actor-based
optimality logic they use to explain the previous
example by Broughton (1994, 1995); that is, by
arguing that because individuals have evolved
cognitive capabilities that allow them to perceive
the relative efficiency of different means for ac-
quiring resources, they will  make decisions  which
will produce the highest net gains (p.S147). No
consideration is given to historical contingency
in their discussion. That the recent example of
snowmobile adoption may be due to penetration
of capitalism into precapitalist modes of produc-
tion is not considered relevant. However, as
Bradby (1980) and Bettinger (1991) suggest, the
economic “rationality” of hunter-gatherers is
closely intertwined with the historicity of capi-
talism and thus a more detailed investigation of
how the choice of prey, technology, and other
socio-economic and cultural behaviors in tradi-
tional societies have been shaped by capitalist ex-
ploitation, dependency and hegemony is required.
The empirical facts provided by AEE are thus ei-
ther applicable in highly limited circumstances or
better explained by alternative theoretical formu-
lations which recognize biophysical and socio-cul-
tural structures and their historical contingency.
Smith (1991) seems to be at least implicitly
aware of the importance of historical processes.
For example, in his research among the Canadian
Inuit (Smith 1991), he observes that even when
utilizing different methods and measures and cost-
benefit analyses among these Arctic foragers, for-
aging still emerges from these calculations as less
profitable than alternative sources of livelihood
(p. 393). Simple optimal models cannot account
for foraging behavior at different historical peri-
ods. Thus, Smith is left with a dilemma: if humans
make optimal decisions,2 then why do the Inuit
continue to engage in a large amount of foraging
during the observation period of his study?
A more complex theory, unburdened by
optimality assumptions, which recognizes for ex-
ample the trend of increasing monetization,
mechanization and proletarianization in tradi-
tional societies on the one hand, and the histori-
cal process of dissolution (which may range from
gradual to rapid, partial to complete) of direct
producers from the means of production engen-
dered by the historical expansion of capitalist
structures and relations, on the other, is required.
The important point is this: human behavioral
outcomes (in this example foraging behaviors) are
rarely if ever due to any fixed predetermined or
innate characteristic of our species’ decision mak-
ing, but rather contingent upon particular his-
torical epochs and social structures (see
Hobsbawm 1961: 9-65). Even simple outcomes
may be due to very complex processes and these
processes involve more than just simple individu-
als acting to maximize economic or reproductive
returns. Rather, such historical processes involve
the presence of complex state structures, socio-
2 The persistence of behaviors and institutions that are suboptimal and/or maladaptive are numerous. For a  discussion
of the ‘survival of mediocre’ institutions/practices in human social evolution, see Hallpike 1988: 81-145.
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political relationships, and cultural and ideologi-
cal processes of negotiation. At the very least,
empirical findings should clarify (or involve ref-
erence to) pattern, process, cause and mecha-
nism (see Pickett et al. 1994:37) and locate in-
dividual behavior in their complex multiple en-
vironments, which include physical, biological,
social and cultural at a minimum (see Figure 3
for a graphical representation of a more com-
plete concept of environment).
Such criticisms point to the limitations of
empirical findings derived from simple optimality
models.  Bettinger (1991: 83-130) provides an ex-
cellent summary of optimal foraging models, in-
cluding their limitations. Several points of
Bettinger’s argument are relevant to the discussion
of the AEE domain and will thus be reiterated here.
Bettinger (1991) points out that while simple con-
tingency models (e.g., prey choice model ) found
within AEE might be useful in understanding some
FIGURE 3. A PARTIAL THEORY OF MULTIPLE ENVIRONMENTS.
Concentric spheres denote an evolutionary arrangement of different environments, with an aggre-
gated consumer symbol at the center. Information inputs and outputs to the system pass through
epistemological filter/field/editor/screens (Stepp 1999).
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sorts of behavior, it does not follow that properties
observed in contingency models (e.g., cost/benefits)
are fixed except for relative abundance of resources,
and that individual foragers exist in isolation and
that groups/collectivities can be conceived to act
as independent individuals) are of general applica-
bility in the real world of Homo sapiens. Bettinger
provides an example from the work of
Winterhalder et al. (1989) within AEE to illus-
trate this point.
Winterhalder et al. (1989) use simulation
models of predator prey interactions to examine
the impact of foraging behavior on prey (which is
not accounted for in optimal foraging models of
dietary breadth, since the model rests on momen-
tary contingencies and assumes that prey availabil-
ity is unaffected by foraging behavior) (see Smith
1991, Bettinger 1991). One of the unanticipated
insights to emerge from these simulations is that
increases in the amount of time spent foraging re-
sults in long-term decreases in human population
(Winterhalder et al.1989). If one assumes that prey
availability is less than required to sustain a given
forager population level and individual caloric re-
quirement, then increasing work hours only acts
to decrease further the size of the prey population,
which in turn leads to further energetic deficits for
foragers. This simulation reveals that over the long-
run, predator/prey interactions are of fundamen-
tal importance, particularly given constraints such
as time and resources.
Another example which points to the empiri-
cal inadequacy of simple individual actor-based
optimal foraging models is found in the work of
Winterhalder (1986) on sharing. When modeling
human foragers as isolated individuals or unified
collectives that act like individuals, one loses sight
of  the importance of the social and cultural envi-
ronment in influencing foraging behavior. In as-
suming interaction beyond the individual level,
Winterhalder (1986) shows that sharing is a very
effective means of reducing risk among threshold-
sensitive hunter-gatherers (i.e., hunter-gatherers
who are confronted by variable rates of energetic
return–a possibility ignored in simple optimal for-
aging models which assume fixed rates of return–
and thus whose survival is increasingly threatened
if  rates of energetic return fall below a minimum
threshold). Winterhalder (1986), utilizing hypo-
thetical data, observes that varying diet breadth
alone can provide only small incremental increases
in risk reduction3 and results in large reductions in
foraging efficiency. In his simulation, resources were
assumed to be randomly distributed and the coef-
ficient of variation (i.e., SD/x, where SD is the stan-
dard deviation and x is the mean) of pursuit time
was uniformly set at 0.33. Increasing diet breadth
to minimize Z (the probability that the behavior
will result in a return rate below the threshold) re-
duced standard deviation in return rates by 8%
and foraging efficiency by 6%. In contrast, under
the same simulation conditions, sharing between
just two foragers whose rates of return were con-
sidered independent of each other, reduced the
standard deviation in the rate of return of each for-
ager by 30% and did not affect the mean rate of
return of either individual.
Winterhalder then uses a simple formula to
explore how correlation between foraging rates
would affect the size of the potential gain that re-
sults from sharing. Winterhalder finds that there
is a diminishing effect of  increasing size so that as
group size increases, the costs associated with the
addition of new members (in terms of resource
depletion for example) would eventually outweigh
further gains that would result from reduced varia-
tion in pooled rates of return. Thus, he concludes
that relatively small groups capture most of the
benefits of risk reduction associated with sharing.
This example illustrates the importance of coop-
eration in human societies where risk reduction
and resource shortfall are prevalent (Bettinger
1991: 126). One could imagine a host of other
social, economic, political and cultural factors ig-
nored by optimality models which directly or in-
directly influence foraging behavior (e.g., politi-
3 Under the expectations of  risk-minimization explored by Z-score models, foragers ought to constrict diet breadth
when resources are abundant (that is, when resource thresholds are greater than the maximum expected rate of
return) and expand diet breadth when resources are scarce (that is, when thresholds are below the maximum expected
rate of return) (see Stephens and Charnov 1982, Winterhalder 1986).
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cal-economic trade alliances, endemic warfare,
political ties to neighboring nation-states, storage
and its defense requirements, technologies, socio-
cultural redistribution systems, gendered division
of labor, cultural preferences, etc.). Many of these
influences can be modeled qualitatively if not quan-
titatively and would contribute even further to
social and cultural environmental influences on
foraging behavior.
So, as Bettinger (1991) maintains, when dis-
cussing models of evolutionary processes, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that “Even the simplest
[social and cultural] systems that contain interac-
tive elements often behave in unexpected ways”
(p. 130).  However, there seems to be little attempt
within AEE to delineate the boundaries or domain
of their investigation. Thus, missing are well-de-
veloped qualifying statements that various empiri-
cal findings derived from optimality models only
predict foraging behavior in highly contingent cir-
cumstances or at very limited time scales and at
specific levels of socio-political organization or
complexity.
What about life-history theory (LHT)? Does
LHT make empirical contributions to our under-
standing of human ecology?  LHT has contrib-
uted to our understanding of differences in life
history traits among higher level taxa.4 Specifically,
LHT has made an important contribution to hu-
man ecology by highlighting central features of our
life history, such as long post-menopausal lifespans,
late ages at maturity, short interbirth intervals, and
high fecundities (Hawkes et al. 1997).  Theoreti-
cal explanations of  human life history traits, as
well as a precise knowledge of their timing in our
species’ evolutionary history are still at an early stage
of theoretical maturity. However, within AEE,
functionalist/adaptationist explanations are still the
rule (cf. Hawkes et al. 1997).
It is important to note that much of life his-
tory theory involves patterns derived from com-
parisons across taxa (e.g., Promislow and Harvey
1990 who discuss the effects of mortality sched-
ules on species’ life-history characteristics). Biologi-
cal anthropologist Carol Worthman (1993 ) cau-
tions that determinants in the evolution of life-
history characteristics deduced from such compari-
sons cannot be directly applied  to explanations of
phenotypic variation among individuals (see
Smith-Gill 1983 and Lessells 1991 for discussion).
Furthermore, Lee suggests that an understanding
of human reproductive ecology requires attention
to socio-cultural factors. As Lee (1993) maintains,
LHT might be less influential in explaining repro-
duction in human societies where “cultural escape
routes” from biological constraints are evident (e.g.,
in humans, sex and reproduction are not always
synonymous; neither are age at maturity and age
at first birth synonymous; nor is sexual activity
synonymous with mating effort in the classic mam-
malian sense of the term).
However, practitioners within AEE have
failed to appreciate the importance of the domain
and the role of culture when utilizing life history
theory, which may go a long way toward explain-
ing the failure of some key predictions from LHT
to help account for behavioral variation within
human societies. The empirical contributions (or
lack thereof ) of three central issues in human LHT
will be evaluated: 1) birth spacing as a life history
trait; 2) the life history trade-off  between current
and future reproduction; and 3) the “production
function” that Charnov (1993) sets at the root of
life history theory.
Birth spacing using the optimal birth inter-
val model has been tested in a few cases. Blurton
Jones and Sibly (1978) investigated such trade-offs
among the !Kung of the Central Kalahari. The
model is based on the logic implicit in Lack’s (1954)
proposition: the best number of offspring to pro-
duce is that which yields the highest number of
surviving offspring. While the !Kung study  was
successful in that the expected distribution matched
the observed distribution of birth intervals in the
population (the modal interbirth interval), many
problems with the model were later revealed (see
4 Nested ANOVAS which assign the total variance among life history traits in mammals to orders, families, genera and
species, indicate that most variation in life history traits arises at the level of orders and families (Read and Harvey 1989).
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Harpending 1994; Hill 1993; Hill and Hurtado
1996; Pennington and Harpending 1988, 1993).
One of  the major methodological problems with
the model was the fact that child survivorship was
not actually measured (Hill 1993). In a study that
utilized data from a wider !Kung population,
Pennington and Harpending (1988) failed to fit
predictions they drew from Blurton Jones and Sibly.
However, the closest replication of the Blurton
Jones and Sibly model is by Hill and Hurtado
(1996).  However, the authors failed to predict
observed modal interbirth intervals when using this
model among the Ache of Paraguay. Thus, we are
still left with a case of one, with several method-
ological shortcomings.
Hill and Hurtado (1996) also examine the
life-history trade-off between current and future
reproduction. The expectations of trade-offs be-
tween alternative life history functions that require
energy is a basic premise of LHT.  Thus, the au-
thors predict that high fertility early in the repro-
ductive careers of females should entail negative
impacts on their subsequent survival or fertility.
However, the authors failed to find empirical con-
firmation of this trade-off even after controlling
for socioeconomic status, body size, and hunting
return rate through multiple regression analyses
(Hill and Hurtado 1996: 391). Early fertility was
positively correlated with subsequent fertility
among the Ache (ibid.). In fact, the authors indi-
cate that they failed to demonstrate that other sig-
nificant life-history trade-offs exist: “Nevertheless,
for the most part, we were unsuccessful in demon-
strating that life history trade-offs do exist” (Hill
and Hurtado 1996: 391).
The third hypothesis derived from LHT re-
ferred to as the “production function,” states that
biological productivity increases with size; at ma-
turity (in determinate growers) productivity is
switched from growth to reproduction. Hill and
Hurtado (1996) found that larger Ache women
have more frequent births. Their finding appeared
to establish a simple explanation for differences
between !Kung, Hadza, and Ache fertility (adult
women weigh 40, 48, and 53 kg., respectively, and
bear 4.7-5.0, 6.2, and 7.8-8.3 babies per career).
However, enlarging the sample by taking fertilities
from Hewlett (1991) and obtaining adult female
body weights from other publications gives a very
small and nonsignificant correlation between fer-
tility and body weight (Pearson correlation coeffi-
cient = 0.06, P = 0.90, n = 7) (Blurton Jones 1997).
Thus, while LHT can contribute to our under-
standing of the differences in life history traits be-
tween humans and other species and/or higher level
taxa, broadening the domain of LHT to account
for phenotypic variation within human societies
has contributed few if any interesting insights, sug-
gesting a need to limit the domain of LHT.
Derived Conceptual Devices: Hypotheses and
Models
Hypotheses in AEE are usually generated
from simple optimality fitness models driven di-
rectly or indirectly by natural selection and as such
are relatively easy to grasp. However, the use of
models in AEE requires further discussion since
many methodological problems with these mod-
els have been identified.  For example, Vayda
(1995a) has argued that practitioners within AEE
believe that they are explaining behavior by elicit-
ing the beneficial consequences of behavior. Vayda
(1995a) suggests that AEE sees explanations in
much the same way as economics did after the
1950s when predictive schemes were equated with
theory with no attention to the other components
of theory. Popper (1965) himself warned against
regarding theories simply as predictions and reduc-
ing explanation to a practical technological inter-
est in predictions. Thus, Vayda (1995a) argues that
the hypothetico-deductive method found within
AEE has led to equating explanation with setting
forth predictive “models,” testing predictions gen-
erated by them and obtaining confirmation of these
predictions. Vayda (1995a, 1995b) refers to this
problem as “naive functionalism,” or what might
be better described as hyperfunctionalism, whereby
finding beneficial consequences is tacitly regarded
as sufficient for explanation with no allowance
made for the possibility that the benefits in ques-
tion are the by-products of behavior not caused, ei-
ther now or in the past, by the benefits themselves.
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5 Vayda (1995a) maintains that many evolutionary biologists have tackled this problem similarly to social scientists and
attempt to deal with the criticism of distinguishing between traits that are by-products or the effects of non-Darwinian
circumstances from those that have been fashioned by natural selection by using either comparative studies or “design”
analyses.
6 Also problematic with AEE assumptions about natural selection is the failure to distinguish clearly between natural and
sexual selection as Darwin did; but rather AEE tends to subsume sexual selection within natural selection (see Mayr
1972 for a discussion of distinctions between natural and sexual selection). Mayr (1972) thus points to the importance
of questioning, as Darwin did, whether there are forms of sexual selection which result in the evolution of characters
that are useless or deleterious to the species (e.g., the excessive plumes of birds of paradise and peacocks as well as
antlers of certain cervids such as the Irish elk). Thus, as Mayr maintains, “it is distinctly conceivable that extreme
courtship adaptations acquired as a result of sexual selection may actually reduce the ecological success, that is, the
fitness, of a species” (1972: 101).
Awareness of this problem is growing in evo-
lutionary biology (e.g., concepts such as
“exaptation” have been constructed to address the
evolution of characters that may not have been
shaped by natural selection but now influence re-
productive success; Gould and Vrba 1982). How-
ever, little attempt has been made by practitioners
of AEE to refine their methodological approach.
Vayda (1995a) suggests that a partial solu-
tion to this problem consists in demonstrating
(rather than assuming or asserting ipso facto) how
particular occurrences of certain behaviors at par-
ticular points in time have consequences causing
the same (or similar) behaviors to occur at later
points in time. So causal mechanisms or causal
chains would have to be demonstrated, assuring
researchers that the beneficial consequences un-
der discussion are not merely by-products of be-
havior (see Vayda 1995a).5 There is no consider-
ation as to whether or not a Darwinian analysis is
appropriate in a given context. However, Vayda
(1995a) warns that usually there are no data on
actual cause-and-effect sequences–no data on
whether there was trial and error learning by some
which was followed by imitation; whether there
was intense negotiation and consensus by yet oth-
ers, whether greater reproductive success of those
who possess certain behaviors then taught those
to their children, or whether the “fitness” conse-
quences were merely a by-product of other socio-
cultural processes, etc. (p. 228). This means that
disposing of the by-product possibility when there
is no direct historical evidence of the causal his-
tory of the behavioral trait in question is difficult
if not impossible, and as Vayda (1995a) main-
tains, may leave us a long way from being able to
invoke adaptation by natural selection as having
any special explanatory import for a given behav-
ior (p. 228).6
As Bettinger (1991) points out, without an
independent model of cultural transmission, AEE
(much like neofunctionalism and cultural mate-
rialism) is forced to interpret cultural behavior in
purely adaptive terms–as behaviors that promote
“adaptation.” Some argue that this is a reason-
able working hypothesis and constitutes a viable
way of understanding how phenotypic traits/be-
havior fit the biological environment (Borgerhoff
Mulder 1991, Maynard Smith 1978). However,
the downside is that oftentimes one simply as-
sumes that human behaviors are “adaptive” and
it is one’s job to show that this is so. Hallpike
(1988) describes how social scientists use the con-
cept of adaptation as a kind of “Open Sesame!”
to explain every puzzling institution. As a result,
explanations degenerate into the unfalsifiable be-
lief that survival is itself the proof of adaptive
value. The dangers are obvious and Maynard
Smith (1978) recognizes this as the most serious
and damaging challenge facing evolutionary be-
havioral ecology.
Many have argued that adaptation and
optimality are not necessary implications of Dar-
winian theory (Bettinger 1991: 223). Shouldn’t a
Darwinian analysis begin with the question “is
behavior adaptive” rather than assuming it? Also,
the behavior may be adaptive but never selected
for in the Darwinian sense. This illustrates the
further weakness of AEE models–the Darwinism
employed by AEE.
Darwinian theory is equated with a simple
prediction within AEE which can be stated as fol-
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lows: as a result of natural selection, human beings
like other organisms, will “maximize” the net (ben-
efits minus costs) fitness results of their possible
behavioral options (Kaplan and Hill 1992). Criti-
cisms of the procedure of reducing Darwinian
theory to this simple prediction have been made
by evolutionary psychologists, most notably
Symons (1989,1990,1992). Symons (1989) states
that nowhere in his published or unpublished writ-
ings does Darwin suggest that the theory of evolu-
tion by natural selection implies that human be-
havior can be expected to maximize reproductive
success. So the criticism that AEE has reduced
Darwinian theory to a prediction that Darwin
never made is a criticism that deserves more atten-
tion. Inadequacies inAEE models are severe, and
sophisticated mathematical modeling is no substi-
tute for more robust theoretical assumptions, ba-
sic concepts and derived conceptual devices.
Theory Frameworks and Structure in
Anthropological Evolutionary Ecology:
Framework and Translation Modes
While domain has been discussed at some
length, framework and translation modes are also
key components of theory framework and struc-
ture. Frameworks serve to unite all components of
theory into a coherent conceptual structure. Rela-
tionships between conceptual devices are specified,
including the relations between assumptions, theo-
retical constraints and the conceptual components
of theoretical models. Translation modes facilitate
the operationalization of abstract ideas, generali-
zations and models to actual field situations and/
or experiments and back again.
AEE has attempted to refine its neo-Darwin-
ian explanatory framework by distinguishing be-
tween history and evolution. Historical change re-
fers to the period of human history characterized
by nonselection-driven change, but still capable of
producing adaptive changes due to phenotypic
plasticity in response to environmental conditions
(Boone and Smith 1998). “History” is said by AEE
to be driven by human intent or decision-making
whereas evolutionary change is natural selection-
driven. In short, AEE assumes “that the [histori-
cal] trait under study has been designed by natural
selection to have sufficient phenotypic plasticity
to track environmental variation optimally” (Boone
and Smith 1998:S145). That is, humans have
evolved cognitive abilities during our evolution-
ary past for perceiving the relative efficiency of dif-
ferent ways of acquiring resources. These skills are
expected to be reflected in behaviors today. Thus
even though the ability to respond facultatively is
a product of natural selection, AEE argues that this
is not evolution in the strict sense since it does not
necessarily involve changes in culturally transmit-
ted trait or gene frequency.
 However, there are several problems with this
framework. First, when does evolutionary time and
natural selection-driven change end and history and
phenotypic adaptation, driven by “decision-mak-
ing,” begin? Does evolutionary time end with
Homo sapiens sapiens, with the rise of culture dur-
ing the Upper Paleolithic, or with the rise of agri-
culture or the rise of the state? How do translation
modes, which facilitate the conceptual transposi-
tion of abstract ideas, generalizations and models
to on-the-ground research differ when examining
Homo sapiens neanderthalensis as opposed to Homo
sapiens sapiens, early and contemporary hunting
and gathering groups, early urban and modern
urban folk? In order to untangle the complexities
of human behavior, more robust translation modes
which address human behavior at different evolu-
tionary and historical scales and levels of social
organization and complexity are required.
Equally problematic is the use of natural se-
lection-driven change as a major explanatory frame-
work within AEE. Whether one argues that a given
trait exists because of phenotypic adaptation or
natural selection, both explanations are functional/
adaptationist in nature. Behaviors or traits, whether
directly or indirectly the result of natural selection,
are still posited as being largely the result of
the explanatory mechanism of natural selection.7
7 The natural selectionist framework is also at the heart of another anthropological Darwinian theory, Evolutionary
Archaeology (EA).  EA considers social systems to be populations of competing behaviors and their products; that is,
cultural artifacts. Under selectionism, cultural evolution refers to the differential representation of variation at all
scales among cultural traits or behaviors (Jones et al. 1995: 28).
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No role is given to cultural processes or socio-cul-
tural constraints. Further, AEE  tends to ignore
the role of social institutions and other socio-cul-
tural processual explanations of change. AEE with
its strong methodological individualist stance fails
to appreciate the hierarchical nature of social life
and the role of social structures and processes in
shaping and constraining individual behavior, and
envisions a problematic separation of the organ-
ism from its broader environments.
The theory of environment found in AEE is
too narrow in its adherence to a Darwinian separa-
tion of the organism from its environments. The
problem with this distinction in human socio-cul-
tural systems will be discussed next.
AEE upholds the Darwinian notion of the
distinctiveness of inherited variations in organisms
on the one hand, and environmental selection on
the other. As Lyman and O’Brien (1998) point out,
the notion of independence between organismic
variation and environmental selection cuts evolu-
tionary theory loose from the teleological system
which had bound it up until the writing of The
Origin of the Species. The problem however, lies in
applying this distinction to human socio-cultural
systems. Should we assume that, like organic traits,
cultural traits and cultural behaviors are distinct
from their environment?
In human systems, the distinction between
organism and environment raises serious problems.
Cultural traits are not clearly bounded entities like
organic traits or biophysical environment traits,
which add up to form populations of traits; rather
in human societies, cultural ideas, institutions, val-
ues, and behaviors are parts of organized systems
of meaning bounded together largely by informa-
tion flows (Hallpike 1988: 27). In human societ-
ies, we thus have various subsystems such as mar-
riage systems, inheritance systems, kinship systems,
gender systems, political systems, etc., which have
certain structural properties. The attempt to dis-
cretely isolate a particular trait or a number of traits
from these subsystems is to ignore social organiza-
tion. Ingold (1998) similarly points out that re-
cent work in anthropology stresses the insepara-
bility of knowledge and practice and the embod-
ied character of cultural skills of action and per-
ception (see also Bourdieu 1990, Csordas 1990,
Lave and Wenger 1991). If the human social sci-
ences have contributed anything to our under-
standing of human behavior over the last several
hundred years, it is that human behavior is never
context free and without structure. Behavior must
be understood in the context of social institutions.
For those who are unconvinced that cultural
traits and behaviors are not without paradoxical
structure and hence not merely an aggregated
population of (behavioral) traits (or adaptations
resulting from individual decision rules or behav-
ioral strategies), it might be useful to consider ex-
actly what is implied by consideration of cultural
traits as phenotypic traits. Hallpike (1988) high-
lights the problem of viewing human cultural traits
in isolation from their environment. He states: “ar-
tifacts, firms, customs, institutions, etc. do not just
compete in an environment, they are the environ-
ment, since they mutually affect one another and
contribute to one another’s existence.” Thus cul-
tural selectionism leads to a complete confusion of
the organism/environment distinction crucial to
Darwinian theory. As Hallpike points out, “selec-
tion itself is no longer an independent variable
operating from outside society but becomes an
integral aspect of its internal working, a depen-
dent variable in fact” (p. 57). For Darwin, selec-
tion as a concept is not a teleological force and
thus the process that does the selecting should not
itself be directly affected by what it selects. Thus, I
submit that the concept of cultural selectionism
has no conceptual utility and should be rejected.
Again Hallpike sums it up best: “If as in [human]
society, everything to some extent can potentially
affect everything else, there is absolutely no point
in retaining the concept of selection at all: mutual
selection is nothing more than mutual interaction”
(ibid.).
However, AEE claims to differ from other
reductionist theories in biology (e.g., sociobiology)
because of its emphasis on behavioral “plasticity”
in response to environmental contingency. Upon
closer examination, however, this distinction is little
more than cosmetic. The notion of environment
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employed by AEE is inadequate. In terms of basic
concepts and explanatory framework, AEE con-
tinues to look internally to answer fundamental
questions about human behavioral variation and
change. “Environment” is no more than a passive
background, a shifting mosaic against which an
ahistorical functionalist narrative is imposed.8 In
AEE, when the environment is alluded to, it is so
artificially restricted as to be useless.
AEE defines environment as “everything ex-
ternal to an organism that impinges upon its prob-
ability of survival and reproduction. The effects
can bear on development, physiology, or behav-
ior” (Winterhalder and Smith 1992: 8). AEE dis-
tinguishes between parametric and strategic envi-
ronmental contexts (ibid.). Parametric environ-
mental contexts are defined as contexts (e.g., physi-
cal environment) independent of the organism’s
decisions and can be analyzed using simple opti-
mization models. Strategic environments (e.g., so-
cial environment), those where the optimal behav-
ior is dependent on the frequency of optimal and
alternative behaviors, are studied using the con-
cept of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) with
concepts and models based on game theory. For-
aging behavior is usually assumed to occur in a
“strategic” environment and studied with optimi-
zation models. However, whether strategic or para-
metric, the environment is less significant than one
might expect. It seems that whatever the context,
the outcome is still predetermined (i.e., equilib-
rium in strategic environments or optimal fitness
in parametric environments). Thus, in practice the
concept of plasticity in AEE means the following:
Environments change and behaviors change accord-
ingly, but the outcome, the name of the game remains
the same: stability or fitness. Is it not gratuitous to
invoke concepts of context (the notion of environ-
ment) and variability (plasticity) when the outcome
is already predetermined?
Analyzing individual foraging behavior or any
other behavior without embedding them in broader
social, cultural, and biophysical contexts (graphi-
cally depicted in Figure 3) is absurd. As noted ear-
lier, the sharp organism-environment dichotomy
is a problematic concept in human socio-cultural
systems. Individuals cannot be divorced from their
broader environments and the complex structures
and feedback processes they include. Moreover,
because of the structural duality of externalized
cognition, social institutions prevalent in human
social environments are ontologically complex and
not easily placed exclusively in either the input
environment, the output environment, or the or-
ganism (see Stepp 1999). However, there is yet
another problem with the theory of environment
utilized by AEE.
The last weakness regarding theory frame-
work and structure that will be discussed is that
pertaining to culture. In the case of optimal forag-
ing theory, there is an assertion that all other things
save efficiency are essentially random and thus can-
cel each other out. The untestable position taken
is that behavioral data on subsistence is more in-
teresting and important than behavior with regard
to cultural preferences, identity, style, etc. (see
Bettinger 1991: 164). Given that culture can be
ignored as noise in models (e.g., O’Connel et al.
1982) or given the position of some practitioners
that  “I personally find ‘culture’ unnecessary”
(Betzig 1997: 17) or that  “the latter[culture] is
very accommodating: it does not get in the way of
fitness maximization” (Kacelnik and Krebs 1997:
28), then there may be no attempt in the near fu-
8 In BEE, similarly, the environment is merely a changing background against which the details of the game of repro-
ductive success are played out (for a discussion of “environment” in  BEE see Eldredge 1999: 148). In BEE, the
driving force behind evolution is competition for reproductive success among genes or among organisms of the same
species within local populations. While BEE looks internally to address the question of what drives evolution,
paleobiologists and paleoecologists see evolution differently. They see patterns in the evolution of life as both episodic
and characteristically cross-genealogical, meaning that evolutionary pulses typically affect many lineages of a region
simultaneously. Thus, Eldredge (1999) argues that the ecological realm must be more explicitly linked to the evolu-
tionary process.  If common ground is to be achieved in evolutionary biology, at the very least, additional theoretical
structure must be developed. As Eldredge points out “Such a structure must go beyond the genetics of organisms
within populations, or even beyond concepts such as punctuated equilibria, which acknowledges the episodic, but not
cross-genealogical, aspects [for example, ecosystems] of patterns in the history of life” (1999:148).
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ture to seriously consider the role of culture.
Bettinger (1991) best characterizes the puzzling
dismissal of cultural preferences in models em-
ployed by evolutionary ecologists. He writes:
Those who are convinced that these distinctly
cultural phenomena are wholly unimportant are
by any objective measure in the wrong business:
It would be easier and far more profitable to work
with another species on which any number of
experiments can be performed and where there is
no need to consider and circumvent by deference
and respect alternative systems of thought and
custom. In short, where the data are not, as Harris
(1968: 361) puts it, “emically contaminated.”
Surely the study of economic optimality would
be simpler without the “epiphenomena” of
culture–without having to work around quaint
native misunderstandings of the world as it
actually is. (p.166)
Conclusions
AEE as a theoretical paradigm remains con-
ceptually inadequate in several respects, but prin-
cipally in its failure to consider the domain of
theory and how historical and cultural processes
impinge upon the structure and function of hu-
man ecological structures and practices. Specifi-
cally, in terms of basic conceptual devices, the con-
cept of “environment” is too simplistic; the con-
cept of “history” is still functionalist and ahistorical;
a priori assumptions about optimality and adapta-
tion seriously limit the empirical investigation of
socio-cultural patterns and processes and usually
leads to hyperfunctionalist post hoc accommoda-
tive reasoning; the assumption of methodological
individualism prevents serious consideration of the
role of institutions in social and cultural evolution
as well as recognition of the hierarchical nature of
social life; and the selectionist view leads to a frag-
mented analysis of human socio-cultural variation
and change. The individual human as agent is even
a caricature–sort of a mechanical and predictable
cartoon character–an object of humor more than
an actor in the complex play of life.
In terms of the empirical content of AEE,
when taking the domain into account, most of
the empirical findings are of narrow significance.
One exception lies in the realm of life history
theory which has contributed to our understand-
ing of unique features of human life history. How-
ever, again the inability to find empirical confir-
mation of life history trade-offs within human
societies points to a failure by AEE to consider
the scope of theory.  The derived conceptual de-
vices employed by AEE are also problematic. Pre-
dictive models are often equated with explana-
tion and the use of “behavioral strategies” used as
translation modes do not specify the temporal
scale of investigation.
The major critique pertaining to the theo-
retical structure and framework of AEE surrounds
domain. The failure of AEE to bound the do-
main of its investigation is clear. In addition, in
terms of causal explanation,  AEE has failed to
develop a more holistic theory of environment
and seriously consider the role of culture in hu-
man evolution. All of these criticisms point to
clear limitations of AEE as a theoretical paradigm
and suggest the need for substantial refinement
and revision or rejection of basic conceptual and
derived conceptual devices.
In short, the search for how humans are just
like other species is the underlying tradition in
the approach criticized here. But each species is
also unique, and it is in the search for explana-
tions of human lifeways that we must develop
theoretical frameworks more encompassing and
ecologically sophisticated than those that can be
borrowed largely unmodified from biology sensu
stricto. Figure 4 provides a futuristic look, an ini-
tial attempt to develop a more encompassing
framework for human evolutionary ecology. For
many it may seem that the promise of an anthro-
pological evolutionary ecology has been stolen.
However, what I am calling for is a new evolu-
tionary ecology, one that goes beyond the apolo-
getic capitalist world-view of biology.
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